Last Call: <draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-12.txt> (BGPsec Operational Considerations) to Best Current Practice

[Job Snijders]

Hi all,

This following paragraph looks somewhat awkward to me.

TEXT:
An edge site which does not provide transit and trusts its
upstream(s) SHOULD only originate a signed prefix announcement and
need not validate received announcements.

COMMENT:
If you are multihomed and receive full (or partial) tables, there is
benefit in validating the received routes, if not: why not? One
upstream might be poisoned while the other isn't? Mabye the text
should be amended to make it clear that this might apply if the stub
ASN only takes default-originates?

Kind regards,

Job

The IESG has received a request from the Secure Inter-Domain Routing WG
- 'BGPsec Operational Considerations'
<draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-12.txt> as Best Current Practice
The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
Abstract
Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many
operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and
present the most critical and universal. It is expected to evolve as
BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed.
The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops/
IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops/ballot/
No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.
The document contains these normative downward references.
rfc6811: BGP Prefix Origin Validation (Proposed Standard - IETF stream)
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol: BGPsec Protocol Specification (None - IETF stream)
rfc6493: The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Ghostbusters Record (Proposed Standard - IETF stream)
Note that some of these references may already be listed in the acceptable Downref Registry.

[Randy Bush]

hi job,

Post by Job Snijders
An edge site which does not provide transit and trusts its
upstream(s) SHOULD only originate a signed prefix announcement and
need not validate received announcements.
If you are multihomed and receive full (or partial) tables, there is
benefit in validating the received routes, if not: why not? One
upstream might be poisoned while the other isn't? Mabye the text
should be amended to make it clear that this might apply if the stub
ASN only takes default-originates?

that is why it is SHOULD. and note it does say "and trusts its
upstream(s)." going down the rat-hole of trusting upstreams differently
seems an exercise in adding words but not adding value.

note that doing path validation would pretty much mean the end site buys
new hardware. pointing out that one could avoid that was the purpose of
the paragraph.

if i made any change, it would be a rant about out-sourcing security.
e.g. "Note that this is out-sourcing security, which is generally
unwise. But the trade-off is likely out-sourcing security or buying
bigger hardware."

randy